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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
ZACHERY DON ZAELIT, : Case No. 20090405-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
Defendant Zachary Zaelit has raised a sufficiency issue on appeal where the State 
relied solely on inconsistent out-of-court statements for the conviction. See Br. of 
Appellant, dated August 27, 2009. The out-of-court statements were unsworn and they 
lacked corroboration and reliability. See State v. Ramsey, 782 P.2d 480, 484 (Utah 1989) 
(recognizing that inconsistent out-of-court statements are insufficient for a conviction); 
State ex reL C.L.. No. 20040037-CA, 2005 UT App 221 (unpublished) (stating 
uncorroborated "'out-of-court statements] which [are] denied at trial by the declarant 
[are] insufficient by [themselves] to sustain a conviction'") (alterations in original) (cita-
tion omitted); State v. Hamilton, No. 20060131-CA, 2007 UT App 130 (unpublished). 
The State disagrees. It claims this Court should refuse to reach the merits of the 
issue since Zaelit has not raised a "concomitant ineffective assistance of counsel claim." 
Br. of Appellee, 11. Yet Zaelit has presented the issue under the plain-error doctrine. Br. 
of Appellant, Part D. That is appropriate and does not require a corresponding claim for 
ineffective assistance of counsel. This Court may reach the merits of the issue here. IcL 
1 
In addition, the State claims that inconsistent out-of-court statements are enough to 
support a conviction. In connection with that argument, the State impugns Ramsey, 782 
P.2d 480. See_ Br. of Appellee, 18. And it cites to the preponderance-of-the-evidence 
standard. Br. of Appellee, 17. Yet Ramsey is relevant to the issue here. In addition, this 
Court will assess the issue with the reasonable-doubt standard in mind. See State v. 
Hglggte, 2000 UT 74, f^ 18, 10 P.3d 346 (stating a reviewing court will consider whether 
the evidence was such that reasonable minds entertained reasonable doubt). Under that 
standard, the evidence was insufficient. For the reasons set forth in the opening brief and 
here, Zaelit respectfully asks this Court to reverse the conviction. 
ARGUMENT 
THE EVIDENCE WAS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT, 
A. AS A PROCEDURAL MATTER, ZAELIT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO 
RAISE THE SUFFICIENCY ISSUE UNDER THE INEFFECTIVE-
ASSISTANCE-OF-COUNSEL DOCTRINE. 
According to the State, this Court should not reach the merits of Zaelit5 s argument 
on appeal for procedural reasons. Br. of Appellee, 10-11. The State acknowledges that 
Zaelit has raised the issue under the plain-error doctrine; however, it claims that because 
Zaelit did not address ineffective assistance of counsel, the plain-error argument is under-
mined. Id. It has cited to State v. Labrum, 881 P.2d 900 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), yacated, 
925 P.2d 937 (Utah 1996). Br. of Appellee, 11. Yet the State's arguments are mistaken. 
Specifically, the Utah Supreme Court has ruled that when defense counsel has not 
preserved a sufficiency issue at trial, a defendant must demonstrate "exceptional circum-
stances" or "plain error" on appeal. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^ 11; see also icL_ at ^ 12 
(stating "'the exceptional circumstances exception5" applies "'to rare procedural anoma-
lies'") (citation omitted). The plain-error doctrine is the appropriate vehicle to review an 
unpreserved sufficiency claim since it "enables the appellate court to 'balance the need 
for procedural regularity with the demands of fairness'" and it permits the appellate court 
"'to avoid injustice.'" Id ^ 13 (citations omitted); see also id, at 115 (recognizing that a 
trial court may be obliged to dismiss a charge for insufficient evidence under Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-17-3 (1999)). Since the Utah Supreme Court has not required a defendant on 
appeal to "raise a concomitant ineffective assistance of counsel claim" (Br. of Appellee, 
11) for the sufficiency issue, see_ Holggte, 2000 UT 74, ^ 11-17, n.5 (relying on plain 
error and exceptional circumstances), the State's argument here is irrelevant. 
Moreover, the State's reliance on Labrwn, is misplaced. In Labrum, the defendant 
argued, among other things, that the trial court erred when it failed to make written 
findings for an enhanced sentence under a Utah statute. See 881 P.2d at 903, 905. Since 
defense counsel did not object in the trial court, the defendant raised the issue on appeal 
under the plain-error standard. Id In response, the State urged this Court to rule that the 
issue was waived. See id. at 905. Consequently - and notwithstanding the argument for 
plain error - this Court ruled that "Labrum's failure to object to the enhancement of his 
sentence absent adequate written findings precludes our considering the issue when 
raised for the first time on appeal." IjL_ at 906. According to the Court, "if the error was 
plain to the [trial] court, it should also have been plain to trial counsel, who should have 
raised an appropriate objection. For this reason, a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel typically is raised in conjunction with alleging plain error." Id 
After this Court issued its decision in Labrum, the Utah Supreme Court reviewed 
the matter. See 925 P.2d 937 (Utah 1996). It ruled that the trial court committed plain 
error when it failed to enter written findings for an enhanced sentence under the Utah 
statute. See. uL_ Notably, the supreme court did not embrace the notion that defense 
counsel's failure to object in the trial court would preclude review under the plain-error 
standard. It stated, "We hold that the trial court's failure to enter the written findings of 
fact as required by the gang sentence enhancement statute was plain error and that the 
Court of Appeals erred in not addressing the issue notwithstanding defendant's failure to 
object in the trial court." IcL 
In accordance with the supreme court's decision in Labrum, 925 P.2d at 937, and 
contrary to the State's assertions (see Br. of Appellee, 10-11), this Court may address 
Zaelit's sufficiency issue for plain error "notwithstanding defendant's failure to object in 
the trial court." Lgbrum, 925 P.2d at 937. Indeed, under Utah law, Zaelit was not 
required to raise a "concomitant ineffective assistance of counsel claim" (Br. of Appellee, 
11) for review of the sufficiency issue on appeal. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, fflf 11-17, n.5. 
B. THE STATE CLAIMS THAT INCONSISTENT OUT-OF-COURT 
STATEMENTS ARE SUFFICIENT FOR THE PREPONDERANCE-OF-THE-
EVIDENCE STANDARD. EVEN IF THAT IS SO. THE STATEMENTS ARE 
INSUFFICIENT FOR A CRIMINAL CONVICTION. 
The State charged Zaelit with theft by receiving a stolen car. See R. 1-3 
(referencing July 20 and 21, 2008). Witnesses Copper Hinton, Britnee Emery, and Justin 
Llewelyn were with Zaelit on July 20 and July 21. See R. 143:66, 68-71, 76; 143:87-88, 
95-96; 143:106-10. They testified that Zaelit did not steal or possess the car, and he did 
not aid in the theft or possession of the car. See Br. of Appellant, Part C. In addition, the 
car was not found on Zaelit's property; it was found at a trailer home belonging to 
Shauna Green. R. 143:53-55, 157-58. Also, the owner of the car, Christine Armstrong, 
did not describe finding items belonging to Zaelit in the car. R. 143:54-55. And officers 
did not find Zaelit's fingerprints in the car or on items relating to the car. See R. 143. 
According to the witnesses, Justin Llewelyn stole the car and drove it to Green's 
trailer home. R. 143:90-91, 106-10, 116. Also, Justin removed a license plate from the 
car. R. 143:111-12. He threw the license plate on or in a 1967 Chrysler in the carport. 
R. 143:124. Shauna Green had access to areas where Justin placed the license plate and 
she had the opportunity to bring the license plate into the trailer home. See R. 143:58-60, 
157-58 (stating an officer found a license plate in a bedroom while executing a search 
warrant; also, Green was at the trailer home on July 21 and did not consent to a search of 
the trailer requiring officers to return later with a warrant). 
Notwithstanding the testimony from witnesses, the State introduced evidence that 
on July 21, 2008, Copper, Britnee, and Justin made unsworn out-of-court statements 
implicating Zaelit in the theft. R. 143:144-45, 148-49 (Detective Kaer claimed Copper 
and Britnee implicated Zaelit); 143:127-30 (Agent Olive claimed Justin made various 
statements). Yet Copper, Britnee, and Justin denied the prior statements. See_ R. 143:68, 
71-74 (Copper did not remember); 143:90-92, 100-01 (Britnee claimed the statements 
were not true); 143:114; see also R. 143:117, 118 (Justin denied talking to officers). 
In addition, the inconsistent out-of-court statements lacked trustworthiness. See 
State v. Mauchley, 2003 UT 10, f 52, 67 P.3d 477 (identifying factors for assessing the 
credibility of out-of-court statements); Scott v. HK Contractors. 2008 UT App 370, ^ 10, 
196 P.3d 635 (identifying factors for reliability), cert, denied, 205 P.3d 103 (Utah 2009); 
State v. Webster, 2001 UT App 238, % 27, 32 P.3d 976 (identifying factors to consider for 
reliability of an out-of-court statement). For example, when Justin purportedly made the 
out-of-court statements, he changed his story several times, R. 143:127-30, undermining 
credibility. Also, Justin was directly involved in the theft, see, e.g., R. 1-3 (charging 
Justin as a co-defendant), and thus motivated to make statements to curry favor with 
authorities in the hopes that they would be lenient with him. See_ Webster, 2001 UT App 
238, \ 27 (stating "probable motive" is a factor); Br. of Appellant, Part C.2.(b). 
In addition, both Copper and Britnee testified that their out-of-court statements 
were unreliable. Both were high on drugs. R. 143:67-68,74-76; 143:88,91-95. Both 
were treated as suspects. See.R. 1-3; 143:80. Both gave reasons for misleading officers 
where Copper would have said anything to get out of the interrogation room at the police 
department, R. 143:74, 80, 81; and Britnee was mad at Zaelit and wanted to get him in 
trouble. R. 143: 85-86, 90, 92, 94, 100, 102; see also Br. of Appellant, Part C.2.(b). 
Even though the out-of-court statements lacked corroboration and reliability, the 
State maintains on appeal that they are sufficient to sustain the verdict. Br. of Appellee, 
13-17. According to the State, "three" out-of-court statements presented through State 
agents made it "'more probable' that Defendant was in fact the car thief and "more 
probable" that witnesses did not falsely implicate Zaelit. IdL, 17. 
Yet the State has applied an incorrect standard. It has looked to the preponderance 
of the evidence for civil cases. That standard "requires that the evidence be such that 
reasonable minds acting fairly thereon could believe that the existence of the fact is more 
probable or more likely" than not. Morris v. Farmers Home Mutual Ins. Co., 500 P.2d 
505, 507 (Utah 1972) (emphasis added). The preponderance-of-the-evidence standard is 
insufficient for a criminal conviction. State v. Berchtold, 357 P.2d 183, 186 (Utah 1960) 
(stating the preponderance standard - "or a finding that guilt is more probable than 
innocence" - is insufficient for a criminal conviction); see also State v. Robbins, 2009 UT 
23, \ 16, 210 P.3d 288 (recognizing that the civil standard is less exacting than the 
criminal standard); State v. Reyes\ 2005 UT 33, ^ 37, 116 P.3d 305 (promulgating a safe-
harbor instruction for reasonable doubt where the jury is advised that the criminal 
standard for reasonable doubt is more powerful than the civil standard). Consequently, 
based on the State's argument on appeal - Br. of Appellee, 17 (relying on the "more 
probable" standard) - the evidence here was insufficient. 
Moreover, under the reasonable-doubt standard, courts have ruled that multiple 
uncorroborated out-of-court statements are insufficient. Specifically, in Acosta v. State, 
417 A.2d 373 (Del. 1980), the State charged the defendant with four counts of rape, and 
relied on direct testimony from two victims for counts one and two. M at 374. With 
respect to counts three and four, both victims testified at trial that they were not subjected 
to sexual acts. Id, at 375. Consequently, the State relied on an officer and the stepfather 
to present out-of-court statements from the victims. IdL at 374-75. 
In reviewing the "sufficiency of the evidence," the Delaware Supreme Court ruled 
that the out-of-court statements qualified as "affirmative evidence" with substantive 
value. IcL at 376-77, 377 n.3. However, given the inconsistencies between the in-court 
and out-of-court statements, the out-of-court statements alone were insufficient: the court 
ruled sua sponte that the jury should have been specially advised "as to the unusual care 
that must be taken before convicting a defendant of a particular offense" based on such 
statements. IcL at 377-78 (stating "the legal point" raised by the sufficiency issue related 
to the need for a special instruction). It reversed the convictions on the latter counts. Id. 
Likewise, in State v. Pierce* 906 S.W.2d 729 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995), the evidence 
was insufficient. In that case, a jury convicted the 41-year-old defendant of statutory rape 
of 14-year-old KJB, and he appealed. IcL at 730. He raised a sufficiency issue, where 
witnesses made out-of-court statements about his sexual relations with the girl, and then 
either did not remember the statements, or recanted. Specifically, witness Redman lived 
in a trailer park with the defendant, their three-year-old son, and the defendant's 
daughter. IcL at 730-31. Redman made out-of-court statements to Agent Harms about 
relations between the defendant and KJB. IcL at 731. Then at trial, Redman denied 
telling Harms that defendant and KJB were having sex. IcL Also, she testified that when 
she spoke to Agent Harms, "she was on medication for her seizures" and overdosed. Id. 
"Therefore, anything she said or wrote during that time was incorrect." Id. 
In addition, KJB testified at trial. She acknowledged that Harms and Deputy 
Hubbs "came to visit her because o f Redman's report that "KJB and [the defendant] had 
'slept together.'" 7#. at 732. KJB told the agents she had sex with the defendant, and she 
agreed to make a recorded statement at the sheriffs office. See_ icL However, at trial, 
KJB claimed her earlier statements were lies. IcL She testified that she told agents what 
they wanted to hear "because she wanted to go home and be left alone." IcL 
Agent Harms and Deputy Hubbs testified to out-of-court statements. IcL Their 
evidence contradicted testimony from Redman and KJB. Specifically, Harms testified 
that Redman made a hotline call that prompted Harms and Deputy Hubbs to go to KJB's 
home to ask about the girl's sexual relations with the defendant. IcL at 731-32. 
According to Harms, KJB was hostile but told her about intercourse with the defendant. 
Id. at 732. Also, KJB accompanied Harms and Hubbs to the sheriffs office to tape a 
statement, but the audio failed to work. Id Hubbs "gave the same testimony as did 
Harms about the interview with KJB." IcL 
In assessing the sufficiency issue on appeal, the Missouri court stated that 
inconsistent out-of-court statements are admissible as substantive evidence. Id at 733-
34. Notwithstanding admissibility, statements may require corroboration if a witness's 
testimony is contradictory and in conflict with facts, surrounding circumstances, and 
common experience, and the contradictory testimony involves facts essential to the case. 
See id. at 734-35. The court considered the "corroboration" rule to be necessary in 
Pierce's case where "KJB's trial testimony was 180 degrees opposite of and contradictory 
to her out-of-court statements on the absolutely essential element here, intercourse." Id 
at 735. It stated the jury "should not have been merely free to decide which time KJB 
was telling the truth, without the benefit of corroborating evidence." IcL 
In addition, the court recognized that due process is violated if a jury convicts 
based on an out-of-court statement lacking adequate safeguards, particularly since "[a] 
less than impartial questioner could, hypothetically, maneuver the witness into giving an 
inaccurate statement." IcL Also, the Missouri court looked specifically to the Utah 
Supreme Court's decision in Ramsey, "a case where two children made prior statements 
alleging sexual abuse but then recanted at trial." I(L at 736 (citing Ramsey, 782 P.2d at 
483). It agreed with the Ramsey decision and the need for corroborating evidence; and it 
reversed Pierce's conviction for insufficient evidence. IdL at 737. 
In this case, the State has impugned Ramsey as a "plurality decision" with "limited 
precedential value." Br. of Appellee, 18. Yet this Court has relied on Ramsey as 
applicable law. State ex rel C.L., No. 20040037-CA, 2005 UT App 221 (specifying that 
Ramsey "unequivocally stated" the ruling of the Utah Supreme Court). In Ramsey, the 
defendant was charged with and convicted of two counts of child sexual abuse. 782 P.2d 
at 482. He challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for count one where the State 
alleged that he caused his five-year-old son "to take indecent liberties with his three-year-
old daughter." IdL The daughter reported to her mother that "the boy and defendant had 
played with her cpee pee.'" IcL In addition, the daughter told a social worker that "the 
boy had lain on top of her and put his penis in her vagina while defendant watched. [The 
social worker] testified that the boy corroborated the girl's story." Id. at 482. 
At trial, the boy contradicted the social worker's testimony and denied that he 
"told anyone that defendant had made him lie on the girl." I(L at 482, 483. Also, the girl 
"did not testify as to whether defendant had caused the boy to simulate intercourse with 
her." IdL at 482. Thus, the only "probative evidence" for count one came from the social 
worker: he provided evidence of inconsistent out-of-court statements. M at 482-83. 
In assessing the matter, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that the evidence was 
admissible as substantive evidence. IdL at 483. However, "not all substantive evidence is 
of equal probative value." IcL Uncorroborated, unsworn out-of-court statements are 
insufficient to support a criminal conviction. hL at 484. 
[W]hen [out-of-court statements are] the only source of support for the central 
allegations of the charge, especially when the statements barely, if at all, meet the 
minimal requirements of admissibility, we do not believe that a substantial factual 
basis as to each element of the crime providing support for a conclusion of guilt 
beyond reasonable doubt has been offered by the Government. 
IcL (alterations in original) (quoting, inter alia, United States v. Oricco, 599 F.2d 113, 
116 (6th Cir. 1979)). Also, "[a] conviction not based on substantial reliable evidence 
cannot stand. It is a 'violation of due process to convict and punish a man without 
evidence of his guilt.'" IcL at 483 (citing Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 
206 (I960)): see State v. Gray. Ill P.2d 1313, 1318 (Utah 1986) (requiring the State to 
"introduce evidence independent and exclusive of [a] conspirator's hearsay statement" to 
show "the existence of a criminal joint venture and the defendant's participation 
therein"); see also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 163-64 n.15 (1970) (agreeing that 
due process may "prevent convictions where a reliable evidentiary basis is totally 
lacking"); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 153-54 (1945) (warning that a conviction 
based on unsworn statements of witnesses would run "counter to the notions of fairness 
on which our legal system is founded"). 
The Utah Supreme Court recently relied on Ramsey. See State v. Robbins, 2009 
UT 23, If 14,210 P.3d 288 (quoting Ramsey, 782 P.2d at 483). In Robbins, the supreme 
court reversed the defendant's conviction where it was based on inconsistent m-court 
statements. IcL at f^ 25 (reversing because of "inconsistencies in Taylor's testimony" and 
clarifying the inherently-improbable standard). In its analysis, the court reiterated that 
inconsistent statements made in court may warrant dismissal of a criminal charge. See icL 
at f 21 & n.l (citing State v. Virzin. 2006 UT 29, ^  25, 137 P.3d 787). Also, for a 
criminal conviction, evidence must satisfy the reasonable-doubt standard. See id. atf 16. 
In this case, the State based a felony conviction on unsworn out-of-court state-
ments presented through its own officers. R. 143:140-59 (Kaer's testimony); 143:125-39 
(Olive's testimony). The statements were not presented through a third party - like a 
stepfather, as in Acosta, All A.2d at 374-75; or a counselor, as in Ramsey, 782 P.2d at 
482-83. In addition, the officers did not record the statements. See R. 143:140-59; 
143:125-39. Rather, they provided their own descriptions of the statements and of the 
demeanor of the declarants. R. 143:143-45, 148-50 (reflecting that Kaer interviewed two 
witnesses and considered the statements to be "the same"; also, he considered the 
witnesses to be "honest right down to the drugs" they used); 143:126-30, 136-38 
(reflecting that Olive interviewed the co-defendant Justin). 
While the evidence of the out-of-court statements was admissible under Utah law, 
that issue is separate and distinct from the question of sufficiency for a conviction since 
"not all substantive evidence is of equal probative value." Ramsey, 782 P.2d at 483-84 
(stating that such evidence is admissible but insufficient to sustain a conviction); Pierce, 
906 S.W.2d at 734-35 (stating uncorroborated, inconsistent out-of-court statements are 
admissible but insufficient, requiring reversal). 
Indeed, the unsworn out-of-court statements here were unreliable. R. 143:68, 71-
76, 80-81 (Copper did not remember statements, she was on drugs, and she would have 
said anything to get out of the interrogation room); 143:85-86, 88, 89, 90-95, 100-02 
(Britnee maintained the statements were not true, she was on drugs, she lied about her 
name, and she made statements to get Zaelit in trouble); 143:114-18 (Justin denied 
talking to officers); 143:127-30 (Olive testified that Justin's responses were vague and he 
changed his story); see Br. of Appellant, Part C.2; see also Ramsey, 782 P.2d at 483 (the 
boy denied making statements to the social worker); Pierce, 906 S.W.2d at 731, 732 
(Redman claimed her out-of-court statements were incorrect because she had overdosed 
on medication; and witness KJB lied to agents because she wanted to go home). 
In addition, the record supports a "lack of trustworthiness in the atmosphere where 
the prior out-of-court statements were] procured," Pierce, 906 S.W.2d at 735, since 
officers acknowledged they obtained the statements in an interrogation setting, and the 
witnesses were treated like suspects. See R. 143:126-28, 142-44; see also Webster, 2001 
UT App 238, Tf 27 (identifying factors for trustworthiness, including, motivation, the 
surrounding circumstances, the declarant's character for truthfulness, and whether the 
statements were given voluntarily); State v. Drawn, 791 P.2d 890, 894 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990) (recognizing that "statements made in an obvious attempt to curry favor with the 
authorities by inculpating defendant and exculpating declarant, lack trustworthiness"). 
Moreover, the out-of-court statements lacked relevant corroboration where no 
tangible, forensics, or direct evidence linked Zaelit to the car. See R. 143:53-55 (stating 
Armstrong recovered items from the car, but failing to link items to Zaelit); R. 143:60-63 
(stating officers recovered a license plate); R. 143:157-58 (stating Shauna Green owned 
the trailer and required officers to return with a warrant to search areas in the trailer, 
including the back room). In short, under established law, the inconsistent out-of-court 
statements were insufficient for the conviction. See. Robbins, 2009 UT 23, \ 16 
(discussing the evidence necessary for reasonable doubt); Ramsey, 782 P.2d at 483-84 
(recognizing that uncorroborated, out-of-court statements are insufficient); CJL., No. 
20040037-CA, 2005 UT App 221; Br. of Appellant, Argument. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated here and in the Brief of Appellant, Zachary Zaelit respect-
fully requests that this Court reverse the conviction in this case for insufficient evidence. 
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